Abstract
A doctrinal sanctuary exists in current CAS doctrine, particularly within the urban battlespace, where the target is beyond the visual sight of the terminal controller yet within the close proximity/detailed integration distance that requires it to be attacked via CAS.
Recent experimentation with new connectivity technology offers a form of positive control while minimizing exposure risk and ineffective observation criteria placed on the CAS terminal controller using current CAS doctrine. This technology creates a form of CAS control that merges the direct and indirect concepts of positive control CAS doctrine.
Modernization of current CAS doctrine concepts could take advantage of this new technology and advance tactics, techniques and procedures while returning the tool of effective and precise air delivered fires to the Joint Task Force Commander. Historical studies and analysis reveal that only five percent of targets in urban fighting are more than 100 meters from friendly forces and approximately ninety percent are fifty meters or less from friendlies, although a majority of these types of targets are light infantry or crew served weapons. Recently, urban conflicts have displayed an inclination for adversaries to employ combined arms, such as tanks and artillery and anti-aircraft artillery, within the urban clutter that enhance light infantry or guerrilla type insurgents. Rapid deployment U.S. forces continue to focus on light infantry units heavily supported by flexible expeditionary air capability. Current urbanization trends and recent urban battlefield experiences indicate that U.S. rapid deployment forces will face near term urban contingencies against determined defenders who will bring combined arms threats to bear.
INTRODUCTION
U.S. air forces will be called upon to offset armor deficient rapid deployment light forces.
The flexibility offered by three-dimensional approach paths, multiple attack angles, and accuracy of precision-guided munitions highlight the value of aviation delivered fires in this environment. These air delivered fires are, by any service definition, Close Air Support (CAS), yet current CAS doctrine has not realistically addressed the lethality or limitations that the urban battlespace presents to either the terminal controller or the delivering platforms.
This paper examines available connectivity technology to minimize the limitations of the terminal controller in the urban environment in conjunction with air platform upgrades and developed or nearly complete air delivered precision munitions, and compares these technological improvement implications to current urban CAS doctrine from the operational perspective of a CINC or JTF Commander. In order to allow a more complete analysis, the focus herein has been narrowed to doctrinal implications during the terminal control phase.
Awareness of the capabilities and limitations of the terminal controller, as well as the delivering platform in the urban environment, will help the CINC or JTF Commander to shape the best force and Rules of Engagement (ROE) for a contingency. Precise air delivered fires, conducted under doctrinally modern positive control by terminal controllers able to discriminate between authentic targets and simulations will offset adversary control of both the battle rhythm as well as public support. Perhaps more importantly, the recommended doctrinal modifications will also help the CINC and JTF Commander regain the confidence to employ air delivered indirect fires in an urban setting in a precise, effective and efficient manner.
CAS DOCTRINE -A FORCING FUNCTION
The link between CAS doctrine and combat effectiveness is pervasive throughout the services' entire force structure and application. There is a bi-directional relationship between doctrine and force execution. Success in joint combat execution is heavily dependent upon flexible application of air support, and the proper organization, training and equipping of air forces performing that mission is directly influenced by doctrinal prescription of CAS roles and missions. Simply put, the quality of air delivered combat applications depends, to a large degree, on the quality and relevance of CAS doctrine.
From a futurist perspective, visionary doctrine may well influence system acquisition, joint organization, tactics and procedures. "What the service chiefs say about the conduct of CAS today should directly influence the weapons systems and force structure available to conduct this mission in future years." i Some examples of past service chief force planning and requirement analysis in employment today include specific air weapons platforms such as the A-10 or AV-8B, precision guided munitions such as the laser guided or GPS guided munitions and standardized CAS employment procedures. Both aircraft were designed to be responsive to the ground commanders needs such as timeliness from request to delivered fires and to execute defined minimum accuracy requirements. Precision munitions were designed for more efficiency in striking targets resulting in less risk both in terms of collateral damage and risk to the delivering platforms. Standard employment procedures resulted in better joint application of air assets.
From a current perspective, doctrine directly influences combat execution through senior commander general guidance that formulates specific directives on missions, proximity and integration of the fires with movement of ground forces. The Joint Pub goes further to state that, " The terminal controller has the authority to clear aircraft to release weapons after specific or general release approval from the maneuver force commander…
The two levels of weapons release authority are positive control and reasonable assurance." iv Positive control is further broken into two methods, direct and indirect control.
"Direct control will be used whenever possible. It occurs when the terminal controller is able to observe and control the attack." v The section under direct control reads as follows:
"The terminal controller transmits "cleared hot" when he sees the aircraft is attacking the correct target. There may be times when the terminal controller may not be able to see the attacking aircraft (due to high altitude, standoff weapons, night, or poor visibility). In these cases, clearance to drop will only be given if the terminal controller can use other means to confirm that the aircraft is attacking the correct target and has friendly positions in sight. These may include, but are not limited to, confirming with a verbal description that the aircraft has the friendly positions in sight, the mark in sight, and the target in sight as appropriate." The only other doctrinal method of weapons release authority is reasonable assurance. 
THE REALITY OF THE URBAN BATTLESPACE
Within the urban environment, it is not the weapon itself but rather the environment, which maximizes or mutes an arm's effectiveness. The urban setting is characterized by large three-dimensional areas; twenty to sixty story buildings, all with multi-level basements, extensive underground interconnected complexes and a large but unknown number of non-
combatants. An effective weapon merely needs to exploit the vulnerabilities that the urban Russian helicopter tactics evolved as a result of Chechen tactics by using almost zero altitude target ingress from different directions, simultaneously. In short, conducting effective urban warfare will demand historical analysis, experimentation with evolving technology, and integration of effective tactics, techniques and procedures into doctrine followed by rigorous training and integration into planning.
Recent Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) experiments have concentrated on
examining the tactics, techniques and procedures of conducting combined arms, threedimensional attack in urban terrain. This experiment, comments in Appendix A, highlighted the inherent risk encountered by the terminal controller in urban battles while executing current CAS doctrine. In order to execute direct positive control, the terminal controller was either too exposed or could not achieve an effective observation position, which drove participants to a reasonable assurance position for terminal control. As previously discussed, reasonable assurance is not a concept that that allows aircraft to engage targets of opportunity as long as the terminal controller agrees that they are indeed enemy targets. Reasonable assurance criteria has typically not been granted by JTF commanders in recent contingencies such as Somalia, Haiti and Panama, where the risk for collateral damage and targeting of friendly forces has been too high for the JTF commander to accept. It is unrealistic and would be unprecedented to assume that currently conceptualized reasonable assurance doctrine will be expanded by future JTF commanders in order to permit air delivered fires in urban settings.
In an effort to address the lethality presented to the terminal controller as well as the delivering air platform, the Marine Corps has further experimented with and has initiated fielding of a technology which addresses both standoff targeting as well as standoff air delivery of munitions. The system is called the Advanced Close Air Support System (ACASS) and is further described in Appendix B. The individual components include a hand held computer, capable of uploading national/theater intelligence imagery of the urban environment or area of operation with digital terrain elevation data (DTED) data, software tools and a radio modem. The computer software digitizes the CAS brief and through a touch screen stylus, the FAC can generate three-dimensional GPS coordinates of the imaged target. For example, with a single point of the stylus on the computer screen image, the FAC can generate GPS target coordinates for a third floor window of a specific building. The entire CAS brief is then burst transmitted via a radio modem that is then received by the delivering air platform and displayed to the pilot. The modems can operate simultaneously and independently on any useable frequency using encrypted communications if desired.
When working with allied FACs or pilots, the language or accent barrier can be all but eliminated. Additionally, the radio modem data link provides a "near real time" graphic of the inbound aircraft as it proceeds toward the target that is overlaid on scaleable maps or imagery. This permits the terminal controller to monitor the attack profile, with any issued attack heading or altitude restrictions, and provide the clearance to drop without using voice communications. Burst transmission and frequency agile data links have been demonstrated over numerous operational evaluations and in recent MCWL fleet experiments. This capability exists in Marine Corps attack fixed wing aviation and a contract for the ground system has been initiated. Additionally, rotary wing aircraft undergoing advanced display upgrades are being provided with the software required to take advantage of this capability.
With this system, the Marine Corps has employed technology to overcome many of the early tactical urban warfare deficiencies encountered by the terminal controller. Coupled with GPS capable aircraft and GPS capable munitions, "first pass visual target acquisition by 5 pilots exceeded 95 percent in over 100 runs and bomb-on-coordinate methods successfully discriminated between a tank target and a tire stack within 100 meters of each other." xv Terminal controllers who have used the system were initially apprehensive but after hands on training were enthusiastically supportive.
The interesting issue is why were they apprehensive? The answer is not just that they were employing a novel technical capability but that this form of terminal control did not fit neatly into current doctrine. With this system, the terminal controller may not require visual acquisition of either the target or the delivering aircraft to be convinced that the pilot will attack the designated target. This system may permit the terminal controller to conduct a CAS mission without having to reach observation points or expose himself to a troops-incontact situation. Is this form of control positive control or reasonable assurance? It would appear that by monitoring the inbound aircraft track and how it is complying with FAC provided restrictions that one could assume this might embody the "other means" phrase of direct positive control. In this case, the terminal controller may not be able to see the attacking aircraft but has confirmed that the aircraft is attacking the correct target and has friendly positions in sight. If the friendly positions are within an urban dwelling, it is highly questionable that the delivering aircraft can confirm that friendly positions are in sight and therefore doctrinal direct positive control is not maintained. This system does not fit the current doctrine description of indirect control either. Indirect control is used when the terminal controller cannot observe the attack, but is in contact with someone who can. In the urban environment, troops-in-contact will be even more disadvantaged as the terminal controller to observe the attack. Since communication is maintained throughout the attack, this form of control doesn't fit the current reasonable assurance concept. Experimentation and analysis of historical urban battles reveals that to be effective and survive in the urban environment, the terminal controller will need to be offset from a troops-in-contact position yet capable of calling for and controlling fast reacting CAS. The ACASS system may well address these requirements but creates a form of terminal control that has not been addressed in doctrine. 
DOCTRINAL MODERNIZATION IS REQUIRED
The CINC and JTF commander have been and will continue to be required to address The resort to reasonable assurance was not necessarily based on doctrine but rather on what was possible with the current doctrine and tools available. While post mission reports generally produced positive comments with this form of control, the end result was, in effect, to create a boundary beyond which CAS aircraft could operate (in close contact with friendlies) under more or less autonomous conditions. CAS pilot comments were positive with the general sentiment that they were contributing more to the engagement. Senior commander comments were less enthusiastic with the general sentiment that creating a free fire zone for attacking aircraft in the immediate vicinity of friendly forces was a formula for increased fratricide.
The most positive finding was that use of GPS coordinates helped both CAS pilot target acquisition and FAC confidence that the pilot was attacking the correct target. 
